A reflection on pragmatist philosophy of science (in general) and Matt Brown's ideal of moral imagination (in particular).
This paper addresses the ideal of moral imagination, Matthew Brown's pragmatist account of how to reason about values in science. Extending Hilary Putnam's juxtaposition of Dewey and James, I suggest that personal existential choices are a lacuna in Brown's discussion. I explore some ways in which the gap might be articulated and filled.
@INCOLLECTION{Magnus.MoralImagination,
AUTHOR = {P.D. Magnus},
TITLE = {Pragmatism, moral imagination, and existential choices},
BOOKTITLE = {Values, Pluralism, and Pragmatism: Themes from the Work of {M}atthew {J}. {B}rown},
EDITOR = {Jonathan Y. Tsou and Jamie Shaw and Carla Fehr},
PUBLISHER = {Springer},
SERIES = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science},
YEAR = {forthcoming}
}
The first on-line draft of this paper was posted 21jun2023.