This paper was written for a special issue of Synthese on the epistemology of inclusivness. I withdrew it in response to editorial malfeasance.
Parts of sections 1 and 3 were incorporated into two subsequent papers, What scientists know is not a function of what scientists know and Science and rationality for one and all.
The epistemology of inclusiveness poses the problem of how the epistemic life of a community should be organized. I distinguish three approaches: what we might call the standpoints of first-person judgement, third-person judgement, and group procedure. I argue that each of these approaches is inevitably partial and incomplete. There are significant limits to what can be said about the epistemology of inclusiveness in the abstract. The details of particular communities ultimately make a big difference. I illustrate this point by considering some specific examples: on-line sources (like blogs and Wikipedia) and the elicitation of scientific opinion.
@MISC(Magnus2011x,
AUTHOR = {P.D. Magnus},
TITLE = {The epistemology of inclusiveness (or) Particular epistemic communities are always a mess},
URL = {http://www.fecundity.com/job/paper.php?item=inclusiveness}
)