{"id":1051,"date":"2020-03-03T16:13:52","date_gmt":"2020-03-03T21:13:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fecundity.com\/nfw\/?p=1051"},"modified":"2020-03-03T16:13:52","modified_gmt":"2020-03-03T21:13:52","slug":"differences-reconciled","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fecundity.com\/nfw\/2020\/03\/03\/differences-reconciled\/","title":{"rendered":"Differences reconciled?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In response to my post last week<\/a> about the tension between Peircean and Jamesian pragmatism, Jay Odenbaugh and Dave Smith suggested that the tensions are resolved with Dewey. I’ve been rereading Dewey’s review of James for this week’s class, so let me take up their suggestion and tally the score.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

On method<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Dewey, like Peirce and James, sees inquiry as the activity prompted by doubt and concluding in belief. Real doubt is a genuine disturbance arising from a problem situation. Yet, Dewey notes, “situations and problems are diverse” and “the distinct type of consequence and hence the meaning of ‘practical’ appropriate to each has not been sufficiently emphasized.”<\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This allows Dewey to give a nod to both Peircean and Jamesian conceptions of what’s practical, applying each in different ways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On truth<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For Dewey, “ideas are working hypotheses concerning the attaining of particular empirical results, and are tentative programs… for attaining them.” So the adequacy of an idea is its success in this. What’s true is what works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although he can accept this Jamesian formulation, he is quick to add that the truth is not just whatever offers any satisfaction. The working<\/em> must be for the business intended by the idea. True ideas are ones that are “good for accomplishing what they intend.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There’s no appearance here of Peirce’s concern with indefinite enquiry.<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On outlook<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Dewey explicitly rejects the notion that personal factors might be “ultimate and unanalyzable.” Instead, he writes, “the personal is not ultimate, but is to be analyzed and defined, biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and functioning side.” This puts him (very roughly) on team Peirce, concerned about the collective and interacting elements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n