Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association meeting in Austin, Texas (November 2004) and published in Philosophy of Science.
Background theories in science are used both to prove and to disprove that theory choice is underdetermined by data. The alleged proof appeals to the fact that experiments to decide between theories typically require auxiliary assumptions from other theories. If this generates a kind of underdetermination, it shows that standards of scientific inference is fallible and must be appropriately contextualized. The alleged disproof appeals to the possibility of suitable background theories to show that no theory choice can be timelessly or noncontextually underdetermined: Foreground theories might be distinguished against different backgrounds. Philosophers have often replied to such a disproof by focussing their attention not on theories but on Total Sciences. If empirically equivalent Total Sciences were at stake, then there would be no background against which they could be differentiated. I offer several reasons to think that Total Science is a philosophers' fiction. No respectable underdetermination can be based on it.
@ARTICLE(Magnus2005d,
AUTHOR = {P.D. Magnus},
TITLE = {Background Theories and Total Science},
JOURNAL = {Philosophy of Science},
YEAR = {2005},
MONTH = dec,
VOLUME = {75},
NUMBER = {2},
PAGES = {1064--1075}
)